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A directional wave measurement attack
against the Kish key distribution system
Lachlan J. Gunn, Andrew Allison & Derek Abbott
School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, The University of Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia.
The Kish key distribution system has been proposed as a classical alternative to quantum key distribution.
The idealized Kish scheme elegantly promises secure key distribution by exploiting thermal noise in a
transmission line. However, we demonstrate that it is vulnerable to nonidealities in its components, such as
the finite resistance of the transmission line connecting its endpoints. We introduce a novel attack against
this nonideality using directional wave measurements, and experimentally demonstrate its efficacy.
A
s early as the 1940s, the idea of exploiting classical noise for secure communication has been considered1.
However, these early scrambling systems would resist cryptanalysis for hours1, rather than years as we
have come to expect, and so became a forgotten footnote in cryptographic history.
The idealized Kish key distribution (KKD) system, based on Kirchhoff’s laws and Johnson noise (KLJN)2 has
been proposed as a classical alternative to quantum key distribution (QKD)3. Eschewing expensive and envir-
onmentally-sensitive optics, practical KKD can be implemented economically in a wider variety of systems than
QKD. Such information-theoretic systems have been of great interest since the development of Shor’s algorithm4,
which, if successfully implemented on a significant scale, will potentially break most key-distribution schemes in
use today.
The KKD system is claimed2 to derive unconditional security from the second law of thermodynamics—the
idea being that net power cannot flow from one resistor to the other under equilibrium.
An idealised KKD system is shown in Figure 1. Alice and Bob each apply a noise signal to a line through a series
resistor. The voltage on the line is unchanged if the terminals of Alice and Bob are swapped; if the mean-square
voltages applied by Alice and Bob are proportional toRa and Rb respectively then no average power flows through
the line, and in the ideal case an eavesdropper, Eve, cannot determine which end has which resistance2,5. If Alice
and Bob randomly choose their resistances—resulting in corresponding noise amplitudes—to be either Rh or Rl,
three possibilities avail themselves: both choose Rh, both choose Rl, or one chooses Rh and the other chooses Rl. In
this third case, Alice knows the value of her own resistor, and so can deduce Bob’s resistor via noise spectral
analysis, and vice-versa. However, an eavesdropper lacks this knowledge, and so in the ideal case Alice and Bob
have secretly shared one bit of information. This then forms the basis for Alice and Bob secretly sharing random
numbers that can be exploited as secure cryptographic keys.
It has been claimed6 that transmission line theory does not apply to the KKD system when operated at
frequencies below fc 5 n/(2L), where L is the transmission line length and n the signal propagation velocity,
because wave modes do not propagate below this cutoff frequency. We demonstrate that this is not the case by
constructing a directional wave measurement device that is then used for a successful finite-resistance attack
against the system. The position that frequencies below fc do actually propagate is also supported by the fact that,
at low frequencies, a coaxial cable is known to only support TEMmodes—these modes are known to have no low
frequency cutoff7. An exception occurs when the two ends of the line are held at equal potential; only standing
waves possessing a frequency that is an integermultiple of n/(2L) can fulfill these boundary conditions8. However,
the the KKD system differs in allowing arbitrary potentials to appear at the ends of the line, and so supports
propagating waves.
Several attacks against the KKD system exist, however none thus far have been shown experimentally to
substantially reduce the security of the system9.
The first attacks, proposed by Scheuer and Yariv10, rely upon imperfections in the line connecting the two
terminals; the first exploits transients generated by the resistor-switching operation, while the second exploits the
line’s finite resistance. The former is foiled by the addition of low-pass filters to the terminals11, while the latter was
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An attack by Hao12,13 instead focuses upon imperfections of the
terminals; inaccuracies in the noise temperatures of Alice and Bob
create an information leak. However, it was demonstrated9,13 that
noise can be digitally generated with a sufficiently accurate effective
noise temperature to prevent this attack from being useful in
practice.
A theoretical argument has been made by Bennett and Riedel14
that no purely classical electromagnetic system can be uncondition-
ally secure due to the structure of Maxwell’s equations. It is argued
that the upper bound on secrecy rate by Maurer15 must be zero
because of the locally-causal nature of classical electromagnetics,
and so an eavesdropper can perfectly reconstruct the key with the
aid of a directional coupler. Kish, et al.16 responded that a nonzero
secrecy rate is unnecessary in practice, provided it can be achieved in
the ideal limit.
Results
Circuit analysis. We begin our attack by analyzing the system in
Figure 1 to determine the forward- and reverse-travelling waves
through the transmission line. Let us denote the equivalent noise
voltages of Alice and Bob Va(t) and Vb(t) respectively, and the
waves injected onto the line V ’a tð Þ and V ’b tð Þ. These are related by
V ’a tð Þ~ 12 1{CAð ÞVa tð Þ ð1Þ
V ’b tð Þ~ 12 1{CBð ÞVb tð Þ: ð2Þ
Noting that the mean-squared thermal noise voltage is ÆV2æ 5
4kTBR, we find that
V ’a
2 ~kTBZ0 1{C2A  ð3Þ
V ’b
2 ~kTBZ0 1{C2B : ð4Þ
As the transmission line in the KKD system is short—and so the
forward- and reverse-travelling waves are equal throughout the line
except for a loss factor a—wemay write the left- and right-travelling
waves at Bob’s and Alice’s ends of the line respectively as
Vz tð Þ~V ’a tð ÞzaCAV{ tð Þ ð5Þ
V{ tð Þ~V ’b tð ÞzaCBVz tð Þ ð6Þ
and so
Vz tð Þ~V ’a tð ÞzaCAV ’b tð Þ1{a2CACB ð7Þ
V{ tð Þ~V ’b tð ÞzaCBV ’a tð Þ1{a2CACB : ð8Þ
We may write this in matrix form vd(t) 5 Avi(t) and so find the


























When the line is lossless and so a 5 1, Eqn. 9 is invariant under
permutation of CA and CB, and so the covariance matrix provides no
information on the choice of resistors. However, when a , 1 this
property fails to hold, allowing the choices of CA and CB to be deter-
mined from the distribution of (v1, v2); this allows an eavesdropper
to attack the system by performing a statistical test between the two
possible covariance matrices. Note that we need not measure the
generator voltages themselves—which an eavesdropper cannot
directly access—but merely the waves travelling in each direction.
Statistical processing. We have derived a statistical representation of
the noise that travels along the transmission line; while we might
measure the power travelling in each direction in order to determine
the resistor configuration, the distributions to be distinguished are very
similar, resulting in a relatively large bit-error rate (BER) as was shown
in11. However, comparison of the variances of v1 and v2 is suboptimal.
We derive an improved test using Bayesian methods and demonstrate
that the two cases can be far more easily distinguished than with a
direct difference-of-mean-squares test of Scheuer and Yariv10.
Knowing the covariance matrices of v1(t) and v2(t) for each
hypothesis, we may use Bayes’ theorem17 to determine the probabil-
ity of each configuration. Let C5 0 and C5 1 refer to the events that
(Ra,Rb) 5 (Rh,Rl) and vice-versa, respectively. Then,
P C~0jvz\v{½ ~ P vz\v{jC~0½ P C~0½ P vz\v{½  ð10Þ
~
1
2 p0 vz,v{ð Þ
1




1z p1 vz ,v{ð Þp0 vz ,v{ð Þ ,
ð12Þ
where p0(?,?) and p1 (?,?) are themultivariate Gaussian PDFs for the
measurements from each respective configuration.
The most probable state, then, is given by the maximum-like-
lihood estimator17
C^~
0 if p0 vz,v{ð Þwp1 vz,v{ð Þ
1 if p0 vz,v{ð Þwp1 vz,v{ð Þ:

ð13Þ
The comparison is more conveniently made in terms of the log-
likelihood, which for the n-variate zero-mean Gaussian distribution
with covariance matrix S is given by18
log pS xð Þ~log 1










log Sj j{ n
2
log 2pð Þ{ 1
2
xTS{1x: ð15Þ
Noting that S is positive-definite, we may therefore write it in
terms of its Cholesky decomposition S 5 KKT, and so
Figure 1 | The idealized KKD system. Practical systems include low-pass
filters and instrumentation that do not affect the steady-state signal. The
mean-squared voltages V2a tð Þ
 
and V2b tð Þ
 
are proportional to the
resistances Ra and Rb respectively. Note that in a practical system, artificial
noise sources are used, and thus the equivalent noise temperature in our
experiment is 3.623 1015 K. This is equivalent to 1 VRMS of voltage noise
with a 1 kV resistor over a bandwidth of 5 kHz.We performour analysis in
terms of the reflection coefficients CA and CB.
ð9Þ
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Only the final term depends upon the data, and there only through
the total power of a group of signals K21x formed by linear combina-
tions of the measured waves.
It should be noted that this estimator differs substantially from
that proposed by Scheuer and Yariv10, which makes a simple com-
parison of variances. Themeasured variables in our case are collected
simultaneously and so exhibit the heavy correlations of Eqn. 9. With
these correlations, the likelihood-ratio test provides far better per-
formance than the difference in the variances of the marginal dis-
tributions would suggest. However, if the voltage and current
measurements are considered separately, as in9,11 where only the
marginal distributions of each measurement are computed, these
correlations vanish and so the estimator described in Eqns. 13 and
16 has substantially less power. The distribution of test statistics is
shown in Figure 2 for a loss of 0.1 dB. The presence of correlation
causes the distributions of test statistics to differ substantially, where
otherwise they would be almost indistinguishable.
The results of simulation for various values of loss are shown in
Figure 3. A pair of white noise processes are generated, Fourier-
transformed, and the undesirable frequency components removed.
They are combined according to Eqn. 8 to produce the voltage waves,
and the maximum-likelihood estimator is used to determine the
resistor configurations. This demonstrates that our estimator can
differentiate the two distributions without the unreasonably large
sample sizes that were previously thought necessary11.
Experimental results. Having demonstrated our attack in
simulation, we proceed to experimental validation of the model.
The estimation of hv/hx is key to the operation of the device,
however the circuit synthesis is dependent upon a wave-based
analysis of the system. We therefore measure experimentally the
frequency response of the electronically-estimated hv/hx, shown in
Figure 4, with a wave travelling in a single direction in order to verify
that our analysis is appropriate.
We expect to see a magnitude response linear in frequency and a
constant 190u phase response. This agrees with the experimental
results shown in Figure 4, validating our analysis, and demonstrates
that the signal through a short transmission line indeed propagates as
a wave, in contradiction to the theoretical claims of Kish andHorvath6.
We measure the voltage components in each direction and com-
pute the log-likelihoods (16). Their differences are thresholded to
compute (13); the bit error rates for various averaging times and line
parameters are shown in Figure 5. Even modest losses, below 0.1 dB,
allow more than 99.9% of bits to be determined correctly in less than
20 correlation times, showing that the technique simulated in
Figure 3 can be applied in practice.
Proposed countermeasures and alternative explanations. Several
countermeasures to and alternative explanations of this attack have
been proposed in response to a preprint of this paper; we take a
moment to discuss each of these.
Arguments against the transmission-line model of the KKD system. It
is argued16,19 on several grounds that the wave-based model that we
have used is inaccurate. It is first claimed that the wave equation on a
finite domain does not admit sinusoidal solutions other than of
frequencies fk 5 kn/2L, where n is the propagation velocity and L
the length of the transmission line. However, this quantisation effect
Figure 2 | Log likelihood-ratio test statistics for each permutation of
resistors in Eqn. 9, as in Eqn. 16 with scaling-factors omitted. The dashed
lines correspond to the case where (Ra, Rb)5 (Rl, Rh), and the solid lines to
(Ra, Rb)5 (Rh, Rl). Parameters are Rl5 1 kV, Rh5 10 kV, Z05 50 V, and
a520.1 dB. In (a) the covariances are set to zero, and so Eqn. 13 reduces
to a simple power comparison. The distributions are almost
indistinguishable. In (b), the measurement variables are drawn from a
correlated bivariate distribution having the same marginal variances, and
are far more distinguishable. In either case, as losses increase and so the
variances of the measurements and transformed measurements
respectively differ more greatly, the two distributions, which mirror each
other about zero, become increasingly assymmetric and so far more
distinguishable.
Figure 3 | Simulated eavesdropper bit-error-rate as a function of
averaging time, for line attenuations of 0.01, 0.1, and 1.0 decibels
respectively from top to bottom.The link parameters areRL5 1 kV,RH5
1 kV, Z05 50 V. Note that the averaging time is expressed in multiples of
200 ms. This is the correlation time (i.e. reciprocal of the system
bandwidth) so that the results are bandwidth independent. Transmission
lines with greater loss are more susceptible to attack, with substantial
attenuations providing little protection. The error rates are estimated from
a sample size of 105, with 2s error bars shown.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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is induced by boundary conditions of the form v(0) 5 v(L); in the
KKD system, resistive terminations allow arbitrary potentials to
appear at the two ends of the line and so this does not occur. We
also note that these spatial frequencies do not directly correspond to
temporal frequencies in the injected signals, but are instead indi-
cative of the spatial spectrum of the periodic extension of the voltage
distribution along the line.
It is next claimed by Chen et al19 that the signals within the KKD
system cannot be waves because their energy does not exchange
between electric and magnetic fields. However this will always be
the case. Consider an infinitely long coaxial cable driven by a sinus-
oidal source V0(t). It is shown by Chen et al19 that the relationship
between the instantaneous voltages and currents in a small initial
segment of the line will cause the energy to be evenly split between
electric and magnetic fields. As we are considering an infinitely long
coaxial cable, the voltages and currents contain no reflected compo-
nents, and so will be given by
V x,tð Þ~V0 t{x=nð Þ ð17Þ
I x,tð Þ~V0 t{x=nð Þ 1Z0 : ð18Þ
The distribution of energy between electric and magnetic fields
therefore does not change as the signal propagates along the trans-
mission line. The voltages and currents are known20 to satisfy the
wave equation, and yet they do not exchange energy in the manner
suggested by Chen et al19.
It is further claimed that a lack of discretisation of frequencies
disagrees with the calculations of Planck and would invalidate
Planck’s Law. However, it is incorrectly claimed by Chen et al19 that
Planck’s Law is derived for radiation inside a black-sided box; in fact,
the box analysed by Planck21 is perfectly conductive. It is these per-
fectly conductive edges that induce quantisation of the spatial fre-
quencies21. In simple terms, recall that Planck’s formulation solves
the ultraviolet catastrophe by introducing an upper frequency cut-off
via quantisation. An attempt by Chen et al19 to use this analogy to
argue for a lower frequency cut-off in a coax line is therefore not valid
and appears to have the situation inverted.
Another argument19 has been made against the presence of waves
using the equipartition theorem. It is claimed that the equipartition
theorem requires each wave mode of the transmission line to possess
an energy of kT=2, and that for a line in thermal equilibriumwith the
generators, the power on the line is insufficient to excite even a single
wave mode. However, the non-idealized KKD system is not a ther-
modynamically closed system, but uses artificial noise sources and
has resistive terminations. These terminations dissipate power into
the environment, and the noise sources must be supplied with
external power; the KKD system therefore is not in thermal equilib-
rium and the equipartition theorem does not apply.
It is also claimed by Chen et al19, based on a lumped-model ana-
lysis, that the phase velocity of the propagating signal is dependent
upon the line terminations, invalidating the use of the d’Alembert
solution to the wave equation. However, this analysis conflates phase
and propagation velocities, and similar results—identical except for
the addition of propagation time—can be derived from a wave-based
analysis (see Supplementary Note S1). We note also that, contrary to
the claims of Chen et al19, for guided modes, superluminal phase
velocities do not violate special relativity as they do not imply super-
luminal wave signal propagation22,23.
Contrary to the implication of Chen et al19, there is no definitive
definition of a wave in the literature. Even attempting to define a
wave as a solution of the wave equation is overly restrictive, as waves
in dispersive media do not strictly satisfy the standard wave equa-
tion23. Thus physics texts (e.g.24) define a wave in the broadest pos-
sible terms as a transfer of energy from one state to another with a
finite velocity. A wave does not even need to be periodic—for
example, it can be overdamped or even chirped. It appears that, in
each argument Chen et al19, preselects its own ad hoc definition of
what a wave is in order to arrive at a non-standard viewpoint.
Experimental critique. It was suggested by Chen et al25 that mains
interference or DC offsets, might be responsible for our results, as
they would produce an apparent DC offset during each measure-
ment. Note that DC offsets are removed by high-pass filtering after
digitisation, as shown in Figure 7, and 50 Hz interference is sup-
pressed as well. The delay line is shielded by the coaxial braid, and
Figure 4 | Measured frequency response of the hv/hx estimation circuit in
Figure 6. The derivative increases linearly with frequency, as would be
expected from the d’Alembert solution to the wave equation. The response
H(0) at DC is subtracted in order to remove the effect of wire resistance,
yielding the ‘compensated’ curves above. After this correction we see
%H(f ) approximating the expected 190u constant phase response,
slightly drooping due to the limited frequency response of the system.
Figure 5 | Measured eavesdropper bit-error-rate as a function of
averaging time and line attenuation. The line is approximately 2 m in
length and has a loss of less than 0.1 dB. From top to bottom, 0 dB, 0.1 dB,
and 1 dB of additional attenuation provided by inserting an in-line
attenuator at one end of the line.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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is wound in a non-inductive bifilar configuration26 in order to further
reduce mains pickup. The magnitude of the 50 Hz interference mea-
sured on the Vx channel—see Figure 6—is 15 mV RMS after amp-
lification, and remains constant whether or not a complete circuit
exists through the two resistors to ground, thus suggesting this effect
to be insignificant on that channel. Interference picked up by the V
channel—the quantity considered byChen et al25—increases with the
establishment of a current loop, but at 40 mV RMS this is more than
85 dB below the generator signal, and so insignificant in the short
time over which we average.
It is suggested19 that our apparatus might have non-Gaussian sig-
nals present, and that this known vulnerability might be responsible
for our results. However, our method uses only second-order stat-
istics, and so does not depend upon the distributions of the signals,
but merely their variances and correlations, which can be trivially
computed as above.
Proposed countermeasures. A countermeasure to finite-resistance
attacks has been proposed by Kish and Granqvist27. They propose
to boost the noise temperature of one source in order to compensate
for the extra resistance of the cable.
While their analysis considers only lumped models, our analysis
shows that this type of countermeasure is effective against our attack,












under our model. This allows our attack in its current form to be
defeated if a can be accurately measured by the two parties. However,
it remains for future work to determine if this can be implemented in
a secure manner, as the measurement protocol for a remains
unspecified.
Discussion
The technique above exploits imperfections in theKKD implementa-
tion; while it might be theoretically possible to counter this attack by
reduction of losses as proposed by Kish11, the reduction of losses
substantially below 0.1 dB ensures that this will be infeasible for all
but the shortest or slowest of links.
This raises the question of why our attack should succeed where
existing finite-resistance attacks have failed. The attack of Scheuer
and Yariv10 considered only the variances of the measured variables.
Our attack exploits the large correlation between waves in each dir-
ection; the estimator used above partially removes this common
signal, increasing the ability to distinguish between the two cases
statistically.
We have demonstrated an attack against the KKD key distribution
system that exploits losses within the connecting transmission line.
The attack has been shown experimentally to correctly determine
more than 99.9% of bits transmitted over a 2 m transmission line
within 20 correlation times. As this attack requires that losses be
reduced to a fraction of a decibel in order to maintain a meaningful
level of security, modifications to the system, such as proposed by
Kish and Granqvist27, will be necessary in order to produce a secure
link of any significant length and bitrate.
Methods
A directional coupler separates forward- and reverse-travelling waves on a trans-
mission line20. We have constructed a similar device using differential measurements
across a delay line, shown in Figure 6.
Consider the d’Alembert solution7 to the wave equation in a medium with pro-
pagation velocity n,








The forward-travelling component v1(t) differs from the reverse-travelling com-
ponent v2(t) in the sign of its spatial argument. We use this to our advantage by



















yielding the forward- and reverse-travelling waves as we desire. All that remains, then,
is to determine hv/ht and hv/hx.
The time derivative hv/htmay be determined digitally from sampled values of v(t).
The spatial derivative is approximated as being proportional to the voltage across a
short delay line, shown in Figure 6.
After digitisation, we high-pass filter the signals V and Vx in order to remove any
DC offsets or mains interference. The signals are then combined to produce the left-
and right-travelling waves. The time-derivative hv/ht can be approximated by a
difference operator, however in order to accommodate for the unknown propagation
velocity and delay line length, common-mode leakage into Vx, and losses in the delay
line, we instead use a first-order least-mean-squares (LMS) adaptive filter28 for initial
calibration. A signal source is applied to one port and the other is terminated; this
produces a right-travelling wave on the line, but none travelling to the left. The left-
travelling output V2 is used as an error signal for the LMS filter, suppressing any
contribution from the right-travelling wave.
The real part of the reflection coefficient, seen looking out of the right port, is
computed by a cross-correlation between left- and right-travelling waves. When this
falls below 0.01, calibration is declared complete and filter updates cease. After cal-
ibration, we validate the system by configuring it as a reflectometer. Open and shorted
measurements are made, yielding reflection coefficients of 11 and 21 respectively.
The reflection coefficients of several resistors are also measured, again yielding the
expected values.
We have used this device to implement the attack described above, using resis-
tances Rl 5 1 kV, Rh 5 10 kV, and a coaxial transmission line of characteristic
impedance Z0 5 50 V. The voltage sources are produced by an arbitrary waveform
generator, producing independent normally-distributed voltages over a frequency
range of 500 Hz–5500 Hz. The bandwidth B 5 5 kHz results in an approximate
correlation time of B21 5 200 ms29. Each configuration is set and the covariance
matrices from Eqn. 9 are measured during the setup phase. Resistor configurations
are randomly selected for each test as would be the case in an operational system—
though we used a pseudo-random number generator rather than a truly-random
number generator—and the log-likelihood ratios are computed for the measured
values of v1 and v2. Their differences are thresholded to compute (13).
Figure 7 | The digital signal processing of the directional wave
measurement device, implemented on an STM32F407microcontroller.A
least-mean-squares filter is used at startup to determine the necessary filter
coefficients; a signal is applied to one port while the other is connected to a
terminator, and the filter coefficients adjusted to force V2 5 0. Filter
updates are disabled once the apparent reflection coefficient becomes
sufficiently small.
Figure 6 | The analog frontend of the directional wave measurement
device. Buffering, offset, gain control, and clamping are not shown. An
instrumentation amplifier is used to measure the voltage across a 1.5 m
length of coaxial cable, providing an estimate of hv/hx. After offset and gain
adjustments, the signals are simultaneously sampled by the 12-bit ADCs of
an STM32F407 microcontroller.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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